"34 out of 36 posts were plagiarized"—OpenAI exposes the contents of a fake think tank created with AI
On August 25th, OpenAI announced that it had uncovered a covert operation originating from Russia and suspended a group of related ChatGPT accounts. The operation involved creating an organization posing as a non-existent think tank, using AI to generate a large amount of content, and spreading pro-Russian rhetoric. What's interesting from an engineer's perspective is the specific methods used in this operation and the investigation process that OpenAI used to uncover it.
An unexpected discovery that began with an "investigation of AI-generated content"
The trigger for this uncovering was OpenAI's own investigation of AI-generated social media posts. In the process, the existence of a far larger and more organized operation than initially anticipated was revealed.
At the heart of the operation was the "International Burke Institute (IBI)," a self-proclaimed "expert community" based in Israel. Registered in February 2025, this website claimed to have a wide range of experts, including real, prominent scholars such as Francis Fukuyama and Noam Chomsky.
Plagiarism: 34 out of 36 articles
OpenAI extracted and examined 36 expert-related articles published on the IBI website and found that 34 of them were direct copies from other parts of the internet. In some cases, the articles were even attributed to the wrong authors.
In other words, this "think tank" was essentially disguising non-existent expertise as if it were real through plagiarized content. Furthermore, the organization used its own evaluation metric, the "sovereignty index," which was an arbitrary scoring system designed to portray Russia favorably and criticize Western countries. Reports on France, Germany, the United States, and the EU, according to OpenAI, "touched controversial territory."
A Double Layer of Concealment: VPNs and "Erasing Traces"
From a technical standpoint, the methods used by those carrying out this operation to conceal their identities are particularly interesting. Because OpenAI does not allow access to its models from Russia, the operators accessed the service via a VPN (Virtual Private Network, a technology that disguises the actual connection source).
Furthermore, they followed a procedure of inputting prompts in Russian and then generating English social media content based on that input. They explicitly instructed ChatGPT to intentionally remove linguistic features that would suggest the user was a Russian speaker. The generated content was posted to multiple platforms, including Substack, Telegram, X, Facebook, and LinkedIn.
An Assessment Where "Infrastructure" is Valued More Than "Appeal"
What is particularly insightful in OpenAI's analysis is its assessment of the actual impact of this operation. The company states that, in terms of the number of readers actually reached, the impact was limited.
However, OpenAI positions the importance of this operation not in the "scale of the readership reached," but in the "infrastructure itself that was built." The method of creating a seemingly trustworthy organization with fake experts, reprinted academic research, and a unique (or disguised) risk index could be reused as a foundation for larger-scale covert operations in the future. OpenAI has classified this operation as Category 3 on its proprietary "Brookings Breakout Scale" classification system.
Similar Busts in the Past
This is not the first such incident for OpenAI. In February, the company announced the suspension of a ChatGPT account linked to Rybar, a pro-Russian media company that the UK government described as "partially colluding with the Russian Presidential Administration." In June 2025, it also busted four Chinese-based covert operations operating across platforms such as TikTok, Facebook, Reddit, and X.
The fact that this type of crackdown is occurring repeatedly indicates that information manipulation using AI-generated content is not a one-off incident, but a persistent threat.
What Engineers Should Consider
This incident demonstrates the reality that AI-generated content dramatically eliminates the "content creation bottleneck" in information manipulation. Generating large amounts of plausible content, which previously required the mobilization of numerous human writers and copywriters, is now possible with just a small number of operators and access to AI models.
On the other hand, the fact that this case was discovered and exposed by OpenAI itself indicates that the monitoring and detection capabilities of the platform are also continuously evolving. For engineers operating platforms that handle AI-generated content, creating mechanisms to detect this type of "organized abuse pattern" will likely become an increasingly important design requirement.